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Abstract
In this study, we explore the e¤ects of a change in unskilled labor in China on
the direction of innovation in the US by incorporating production o¤shoring into a
North-South model of directed technical change. We nd that intellectual property
rights (IPRs) and o¤shoring are di¤erent ways for the labor endowment of the South
to a¤ect the size of the market for innovations in the North. Absent o¤shoring and
lacking IPRs in the South - as in China in the early 1980s - an increase in Southern
unskilled labor should lead to skill-biased technical change. If instead o¤shoring is
present and/or IPRs are better enforced (as in China in more recent times), then a
decrease in unskilled labor in the South should lead to skill-biased technical change.
Furthermore, an increase in Southern per capita stock of capital reduces o¤shoring
and also leads to skill-biased technical change. Calibrating the model to China-US
data, we nd that under a moderate elasticity of substitution between skill-intensive
and labor-intensive goods, the decrease in unskilled labor and the increase in capital in
China can explain about one-third of the recent increase in the skill premium in China
through skill-biased technical change in the US.
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1 Introduction
After decades of economic development, China is now experiencing a rapid decrease in the
share of unskilled labor. According to the Barro-Lee dataset on education attainment, the
share of population (over the age of 25) in China without tertiary education decreased from
97.1% in 1995 to 94.0% in 2010. If we consider individuals with the completion of secondary
education as moderately skilled workers, then the decrease in unskilled labor in China would
be even more dramatic. The share of population (over the age of 25) in China without
completion of secondary education decreased from 76.3% in 1995 to 53.6% in 2010, which
even implies a decrease in the number of unskilled workers in China since 1995. In this
study, we explore the e¤ects of a decrease in the supply of unskilled labor in the South (e.g.,
China) on the direction of innovation in the North (e.g., the US) by incorporating production
o¤shoring into a North-South model of directed technical change. We nd that a decrease in
Southern unskilled labor leads to a reduction in the o¤shoring of labor-intensive goods from
the North to the South, which in turn triggers skilled-biased technical change in the North.
Our result is consistent with the following observations. A recent article in The Econo-
mist documents a decreasing trend in production o¤shoring from the US to China;1 for
example, "[t]he Boston Consulting Group reckons that in areas such as transport, comput-
ers, fabricated metals and machinery, 10-30% of the goods that America now imports from
China could be made at home by 2020". Furthermore, as a result of skilled-biased technical
change, the skill premium has been increasing in both the US and China. Acemoglu and
Autor (2011) document that the relative wage between workers with college education and
workers with high school education in the US increased from 1.80 in 1995 to 1.97 in 2008. Ge
and Yang (2014) document that the relative wage between workers with college education
and workers with high school education in China increased from 1.21 in 1992 to 1.52 in 2007.
Our result also highlights the di¤erent implications of o¤shoring and conventional trade
on the direction of technological progress. We nd that if the equilibrium features o¤shoring,
then a decrease in unskilled labor in the South would lead to skill-biased technical change
in the North. In contrast, if the equilibrium does not feature o¤shoring, then a decrease
in Southern unskilled labor would lead to unskill-biased technical change. To obtain these
results, we incorporate o¤shoring into a standard North-South model of directed technical
change. In this growth-theoretic framework, the incentive to develop a new technology
depends on the size of its market and on the price of the goods produced by this technology.
If intellectual property rights (IPRs) are weakly protected in the South and there is no
o¤shoring, which is the typical case studied in the literature, the market size of the South
does not matter, because new technologies generate no royalties or licences there. Thus,
the South can a¤ect the direction of technological progress only through its impact on world
prices. Under these assumptions, a decrease in unskilled labor in the South would increase the
world price of goods produced with unskilled labor and induce innovations complementing
the unskilled, as in Acemoglu (2003). The main contribution of this paper is to show that
this result is reverted in the presence of o¤shoring.
Intuitively, when o¤shoring is absent in equilibrium, a reduction in the supply of un-
skilled labor in the South causes through international trade a price e¤ect that raises the
1The Economist, "The Third Industrial Revolution", April 21, 2012.
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world price of goods produced with unskilled labor and improves incentives for innovation in
labor-intensive goods. In contrast, when o¤shoring is present in equilibrium, some Southern
workers are hired to work with Northern intermediate inputs that are protected by strong
patent protection in the North. In this case, a reduction in the supply of unskilled labor
in the South causes also a market size e¤ect that decreases the value of labor-intensive in-
ventions and improves incentives for innovation in skill-intensive goods. In other words,
Southern IPRs and o¤shoring serve as two substitutable channels for the labor endowment
of the South to a¤ect the size of the market for Northern innovations.
The above theoretical result has the following implications. When China rst opened up
its economy for international trade in the early 1980s, there was essentially no o¤shoring
in the Chinese economy. Together with a low level of patent protection in China at that
time,2 the opening of the Chinese economy implied a massive increase in the supply of
unskilled labor in the world causing predominantly a price e¤ect that improved incentives
for innovation directed to the relatively scarce factor, i.e., skilled labor, and this contributed
to the skill-biased technical change in developed economies. After the mid 1990s, the amount
of o¤shoring to China has started to increase rapidly. Together with an increased level of
patent protection in China,3 the decrease in unskilled labor in China has been causing
also a market size e¤ect that improves incentives for innovation directed to the now more
abundant factor, i.e., skilled labor, and this also contributes to skill-biased technical change
in developed economies.
Another stylized fact of economic development in China is that capital investment as a
share of gross domestic product (GDP) is about 40% and substantially higher than many
developed economies. So long as the depreciation rates of capital are not substantially
di¤erent across countries, China is accumulating capital at a much faster rate than developed
countries. From our theoretical analysis, we nd that an increase in the stock of capital in
the South relative to the North reduces o¤shoring. Intuitively, a larger stock of capital
in China increases the wage rates of Chinese workers rendering o¤shoring to China less
attractive. This decrease in o¤shoring is like a decrease in the supply of unskilled labor to
Northern rms triggering a market size e¤ect. Therefore, a larger stock of capital in the
South also leads to skill-biased technical change in the North. In other words, rapid capital
accumulation and a decrease in unskilled labor in China could both contribute to skill-biased
technical change in the US.
We calibrate the model to China-US data to provide numerical results. Due to skill-biased
technical change, either a decrease in unskilled labor or an increase in capital in the South
would raise the skill premium in both countries. The magnitude of the changes depends on
the elasticity of substitution between skill-intensive and labor-intensive goods. We consider
as our benchmark a value of two for the elasticity of substitution between skill-intensive and
labor-intensive goods. In this case, the decrease in unskilled labor and the increase in capital
in China explain about one-third of the recent increase in the skill premium in China through
skill-biased technical change in the US. Quantitatively, the increase in capital causes a much
larger e¤ect on the rising skill premium than the decrease in unskilled labor.
2For example, the Ginarte-Park index of patent rights in China was 1.33 in 1985; see Park (2008). The
Ginarte-Park index is on a scale of 0 to 5, and a larger number implies stronger patent rights.
3The Ginarte-Park index of patent rights in China was 4.08 in 2005; see Park (2008).
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This paper relates to studies on directed technical change, such as Acemoglu (1998, 2002,
2003), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) and Gancia and Bonglioli (2008). These inuential
studies built on the literature of R&D-driven economic growth to analyze the direction of
innovation.4 Acemoglu (1998, 2002) analyzes skill-biased technical change and the rising
skill premium in the US, whereas Acemoglu (2003), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) and
Gancia and Bonglioli (2008) analyze the implications of trade on skill-biased technical
change and productivity di¤erences across countries. However, the abovementioned studies
do not consider o¤shoring. This paper also relates to studies on o¤shoring; see Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) for a recent contribution and their discussion of earlier studies.
The present paper complements these two branches of literature by providing an analysis of
the e¤ects of o¤shoring on the direction of technological progress.
Acemoglu et al. (2012) also analyze the e¤ects of o¤shoring on skill-biased technical
change. In addition to some di¤erences in modelling details, our study di¤ers from their
interesting analysis by exploring a di¤erent set of research questions. Acemoglu et al. (2012)
explore the e¤ects of an o¤shoring-cost parameter and a patent-policy parameter on skill-
biased technical change, whereas we analyze the e¤ects of a decrease in unskilled labor and an
increase in capital on skill-biased technical change through o¤shoring and patent protection.
Therefore, we believe that our study provides a useful complementary analysis to Acemoglu
et al. (2012) on this unchartered area of o¤shoring and directed technological progress.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 analyzes the e¤ects of labor supply and capital stock in the South on the direction of
innovation in the North. The nal section concludes.
2 A North-South model of directed technical change
In this section, we consider a North-South version of the model of directed technical change
based on Acemoglu (2002). The innovation process is in the form of variety expansion. When
an R&D entrepreneur invents a new variety, her patents generate monopolistic prots in the
Northern market and possibly also in the Southern market depending on the level of patent
protection in the South. For simplicity, we assume that both countries have access to the
same set of varieties of goods.5 Final goods are produced using skill-intensive and labor-
intensive goods, which are freely traded across countries, but labor and capital as well as
the intermediate inputs that capital produces are immobile across countries. As is common
in the literature, we model o¤shoring as "shadow migration" of workers through which the
output of o¤shored workers in the South is combined with intermediate inputs in the North.
As for the cost of o¤shoring, we follow Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) to assume that
o¤shoring involves a variable cost.6
4See Romer (1990), Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991a) and Aghion and Howitt
(1992) for seminal studies in this literature and Gancia and Zilibotti (2005) for a survey.
5See for example Grossman and Helpman (1991b), Helpman (1993) and Lai (1998) for an alternative
branch of North-South models that focus on the gradual transfer of technologies from the North to the
South.
6See Acemoglu et al. (2012) for an interesting formulation of o¤shoring that involves a xed cost.
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2.1 Households
In the North, there is a representative household with the following lifetime utility function:
U =
1Z
0
e t lnCnt dt, (1)
where Cnt denotes consumption in the North at time t, and  > 0 is the subjective discount
rate. The household maximizes utility subject to the following asset-accumulation equation:7
_Ant = rtA
n
t + w
n
h;tH
n + wnl;tL
n + qnt K
n   Cnt . (2)
Ant is the amount of nancial assets in the form of patents owned by the household, and rt is
the rate of return.8 Hn and Ln are respectively the inelastic supply of high-skilled and low-
skilled workers. wnh;t and w
n
l;t are respectively the wage rates of high-skilled and low-skilled
workers. Kn is the inelastic supply of capital,9 and qnt is the rental price of capital. From
standard dynamic optimization, the familiar Euler equation is10
_Cnt
Cnt
= rt   . (3)
As for the South, there are analogous conditions. Finally, we assume that the North is
more skill-abundant than the South (i.e., Hn=Ln > Hs=Ls) and that the North is also more
capital-abundant than the South (i.e., Kn=Ln > Ks=Ls).11
2.2 Final goods
The production of nal goods is perfectly competitive; therefore, it does not matter where
production takes place. Final goods are produced with the following CES aggregator:
Yt =
h

 
Y nl;t + Y
s
l;t
(" 1)="
+ (1  )  Y nh;t + Y sh;t(" 1)="i"=(" 1) , (4)
where Y nl;t and Y
s
l;t are respectively labor-intensive goods produced in the North and in the
South, and Y nh;t and Y
s
h;t are respectively skill-intensive goods produced in the North and in
the South. " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the two types of goods,12 and 
7We also impose the usual no-Ponzi game condition that requires the households lifetime budget con-
straint to be satised.
8rt is not indexed by a superscript because we assume that there is a global nancial market, and our
derivations are robust to any distribution of nancial assets across the two countries. One special case is
that all nancial assets are owned by the Northern household.
9We di¤er from Acemoglu (2002) by assuming that intermediate goods are produced using capital instead
of nal goods. This modication allows us to analyze the e¤ects of changes in the supply of capital. For
simplicity, we focus on an inelastic supply of capital; see the conclusion for a discussion of this assumption.
10Also, the transversality condition requires rt > _Ant =A
n
t , which holds on the balanced growth path given
the log utility function and  > 0.
11See for example, Bai et al. (2006) for a discussion on the relatively low capital-labor ratio in China.
12See Acemoglu (2003) for a discussion of evidence for " > 1.
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determines their relative importance. fY nl;t; Y sl;t; Y nh;t; Y sh;tg are freely traded across countries
subject to international prices fPl;t; Ph;tg. The standard price index of nal goods is
1 =

" (Pl;t)
1 " + (1  )" (Ph;t)1 "
1=(1 ")
, (5)
where we have set the price of nal goods (numeraire) to one. The resource constraint on
nal goods is
Yt = Rt + C
n
t + C
s
t , (6)
where Rt is the global amount of nal goods devoted to R&D.
2.3 Labor-intensive goods
In the South, the production function of labor-intensive goods is
Y sl;t =
(lst )

1  
Z Nl;t
0
[xsl;t(i)]
1 di

(Nl;t)
1 , (7)
where  2 (0; 1) determines the elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs, and
we assume that  > (" 2)=(" 1). lst is the amount of Southern unskilled labor employed in
the production of Y sl;t. In addition to using labor, the production of Y
s
l;t requires di¤erentiated
intermediate inputs xsl;t(i) for i 2 [0; Nl;t], where Nl;t is the number of di¤erentiated inputs
for labor-intensive goods that have been invented as of time t. The term (Nl;t)1  captures
an externality e¤ect of Nl;t on the production of Y sl;t in order to ensure a balanced growth
path along which Nl;t and Y sl;t grow at the same rate.
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In the North, the production function of labor-intensive goods is given by
Y nl;t =
(lnt + o
s
t)

1  
Z Nl;t
0
[xnl;t(i)]
1 di

(Nl;t)
1 , (8)
where ost is the amount of Southern unskilled labor employed by Northern rms to produce
Y nl;t capturing the o¤shoring of production. Following Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008),
we use a parameter  2 (0; 1) to capture the variable cost of o¤shoring. A higher cost of
o¤shoring is reected by a smaller value of . If  = 0, then o¤shoring of labor-intensive
goods would be absent,14 and the model is left with conventional trade in fY nl;t; Y sl;t; Y nh;t; Y sh;tg.
We refer to a larger  as a higher degree of o¤shoring. As a result of o¤shoring, the resource
constraint for Southern unskilled labor is lst + o
s
t = L
s, whereas the resource constraint for
Northern unskilled labor is lnt = L
n.
13In Acemoglu (2002), this externality is not needed because xnl;t(i) is produced from nal goods, whereas
xnl;t(i) is produced from a xed supply of capital in the present study.
14In fact, we nd that if  is below a threshold value, then o¤shoring would be absent in equilibrium.
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2.4 Skill-intensive goods
In the South, the production function of skill-intensive goods is given by
Y sh;t =
(hst)

1  
Z Nh;t
0
[xsh;t(j)]
1 dj

(Nh;t)
1 . (9)
hst is the amount of Southern skilled labor employed in the production of Y
s
h;t. In addition
to using labor, the production of Y sh;t requires di¤erentiated intermediate inputs x
n
h;t(j) for
j 2 [0; Nh;t], where Nh;t is the number of di¤erentiated inputs for skill-intensive goods that
have been invented as of time t. The term (Nh;t)1  captures an externality e¤ect of Nh;t on
the production of Y sh;t in order to ensure a balanced growth path along which Nh;t and Y
s
h;t
grow at the same rate.
In the North, the production function of labor-intensive goods is given by
Y nh;t =
(hnt )

1  
Z Nh;t
0
[xnh;t(j)]
1 dj

(Nh;t)
1 , (10)
where we have ruled out o¤shoring of skill-intensive goods.15 Due to the absence of o¤shoring
for skill-intensive goods, the resource constraint for Southern skilled labor is hst = H
s,
whereas the resource constraint for Northern skilled labor is hnt = H
n.
2.5 Intermediate inputs
For notational convenience, we suppress the index i 2 [0; Nl;t] for the intermediate inputs of
labor-intensive goods and the index j 2 [0; Nh;t] for the intermediate inputs of skill-intensive
goods. In the North, the production function of each di¤erentiated intermediate input is
xnz;t = k
n
z;t, (11)
where z 2 fh; lg. In other words, one unit of capital produces one unit of intermediate
input. Given the capital-rental price qnt in the North, the monopolistic producer of each
di¤erentiated intermediate input charges a prot-maximizing markup n over qnt such that
pnz;t = 
nqnt , (12)
where z 2 fh; lg and n = 1=(1  ) > 1. Therefore, the amount of prot captured by each
intermediate input in the North is
nz;t = (1  1=n)pnz;txnz;t = pnz;txnz;t, (13)
where z 2 fh; lg. Due to symmetry, the resource constraint on capital in the North is
Nl;tx
n
l;t +Nh;tx
n
h;t = K
n
l;t +K
n
h;t = K
n.
15We have found that if and only if a knife-edge condition holds such that the costs of o¤shoring for
labor-intensive and skill-intensive goods are the same (i.e., h = l =  > 0), then the model would feature
o¤shoring in both sectors. Given that our focus is on the o¤shoring of labor-intensive goods, we consider
the case of 0  h < l =  under which the equilibrium features zero o¤shoring of skill-intensive goods and
is identical to the case of h = 0.
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In the South, the production function of each di¤erentiated intermediate input is
xsz;t = k
s
z;t, (14)
where z 2 fh; lg. Given the capital-rental price qst in the South, the monopolistic producer
of each di¤erentiated intermediate input charges a markup s over qst such that
psz;t = 
sqst , (15)
where z 2 fh; lg. Here we follow Goh and Olivier (2002) to model incomplete patent protec-
tion that constrains the markup in the South;16 specically, we assume that s = 1=(1 ) 
n where  2 [0; ]. Intuitively, the presence of potential imitation due to incomplete patent
protection forces the monopolistic producers to lower their markup in the South. If  = ,
then patent protection is complete in the South. If  = 0, then patent protection is zero in
the South. The amount of prot captured by each intermediate input in the South is
sz;t = (1  1=s)psz;txsz;t = psz;txsz;t, (16)
where z 2 fh; lg. The resource constraint on capital in the South is Nl;txsl;t + Nh;txsh;t =
Ksl;t +K
s
h;t = K
s.
2.6 R&D
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs investing in R&D, and the invention of a new variety
of skill-intensive or labor-intensive inputs requires  units of nal goods. If  is the same
across the two countries, then the location of R&D is indeterminate, and our derivations
are robust to any geographical distribution of R&D. If  is smaller in the North than in
the South, then innovation takes place only in the North as in, for example, Acemoglu and
Zilibotti (2001) and Gancia and Bonglioli (2008).17 When an entrepreneur invents a new
variety, she obtains patents in both the North and the South.18 The innovation process is
_Nz;t = Rz;t=, (17)
where z 2 fh; lg. Suppose we denote Vz;t as the value of an invention. Free entry ensures
that
(Vz;t   ) _Nz;t = 0, (18)
where z 2 fh; lg. The familiar Bellman equation is
rt =
nz;t + 
s
z;t + _Vz;t
Vz;t
, (19)
where z 2 fh; lg. Intuitively, the Bellman equation equates the interest rate to the asset
return per unit of asset, where the asset return is the sum of monopolistic prots nz;t + 
s
z;t
and any potential capital gain _Vz;t.
16See also Li (2001), Chu (2011) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013).
17See Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) for a discussion of evidence that 90% of global R&D is performed in
OECD countries and 35% in the US.
18It is useful to note that given the global nancial market, a patent that is based on a variety invented
in the North is not necessarily owned by the Northern household.
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2.7 Decentralized equilibrium
An equilibrium is a time path of prices frt; wnl;t; wsl;t; wnh;t; wsh;t; qnt ; qst ; Pl;t; Ph;t; pnl;t(i); psl;t(i);
pnh;t(j); p
s
h;t(j)g and allocations fRl;t; Rh;t; Cnt ; Cst ; Yt; Y nl;t; Y sl;t; Y nh;t; Y sh;t; xnl;t(i); xsl;t(i); xnh;t(j); xsh;t(j);
lnt ; l
s
t ; o
s
t ; h
n
t ; h
s
tg such that the following conditions hold at each instance of time:
 households maximize utility taking frt; wnl;t; wnh;t; qnt ; wsl;t; wsh;t; qstg as given;
 competitive nal-goods rms produce fYtg to maximize prot taking prices fPl;t; Ph;tg
as given;
 competitive labor-intensive goods rms in the two countries produce fY nl;t; Y sl;tg to max-
imize prot taking the international price fPl;tg as given;
 competitive skill-intensive goods rms in the two countries produce fY nh;t; Y sh;tg to max-
imize prot taking the international price fPh;tg as given;
 monopolistic intermediate-goods rms in the labor-intensive sector produce fxnl;t(i); xsl;t(i)g
and choose fpnl;t(i); psl;t(i)g to maximize prot taking prices fqnt ; qstg as given;
 monopolistic intermediate-goods rms in the skill-intensive sector produce fxnh;t(j); xsh;t(j)g
and choose fpnh;t(j); psh;t(j)g to maximize prot taking prices fqnt ; qstg as given;
 R&D rms choose fRl;t; Rh;tg to maximize prot taking fVl;t; Vh;tg as given;
 the market-clearing condition for unskilled labor in the two countries holds such that
lnt = L
n and lst + o
s
t = L
s;
 the market-clearing condition for skilled labor in the two countries holds such that
hnt = H
n and hst = H
s;
 the market-clearing condition for capital in the two countries holds such that Nl;txnl;t +
Nh;tx
n
h;t = K
n and Nl;txsl;t +Nh;tx
s
h;t = K
s; and
 the market-clearing condition for nal goods holds such that Yt = Rl;t+Rh;t+Cnt +Cst .
2.8 Balanced growth equilibrium and o¤shoring
In this subsection, we discuss the balanced growth equilibrium of the model. The model
features a unique steady-state value of Nh;t=Nl;t. If the initial value of Nh;t=Nl;t is above
(below) this steady-state value, then the equilibrium initially features R&D in labor-intensive
(skill-intensive) goods only until the economy reaches the balanced growth path along which
Nh;t and Nl;t grow at the same rate g, which is constant and positive. On the balanced
growth path, the equilibrium features a positive amount of o¤shoring os > 0 if and only if 
is su¢ ciently large. We summarize these results in Proposition 1.
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Proposition 1 The dynamics of Nh;t=Nl;t is characterized by global stability such that the
economy converges to a unique and stable balanced growth path along which Nh;t and Nl;t grow
at the same rate g, which is constant and positive. If and only if  > [(Ks=Ls)=(Kn=Ln)]1 ,
then the equilibrium would feature a positive amount of o¤shoring (i.e., os > 0).
Proof. See Appendix A.
The threshold value of  above which the equilibrium features o¤shoring is given by
[(Ks=Ls)=(Kn=Ln)]1  < 1. Intuitively, in the presence of o¤shoring, the wage rate of
unskilled labor in the South must be a fraction  of that in the North. However, if the
capital-labor ratio in the South is su¢ ciently high relative to the North, then it would
be impossible for the South to have such a low relative wage in equilibrium. To better
understand this result, we use the following conditions. For the rest of the analysis, we focus
on the balanced growth path and omit the time subscript for convenience. From (7) and (8),
one can derive the following conditional demand functions for ls and ln:
wsl =
PlNl
1  

Ksl
ls
1 
, (20)
wnl =
PlNl
1  

Knl
ln + os
1 
, (21)
where we have applied symmetry on xsl (i) = x
s
l = K
s
l =Nl and x
n
l (i) = x
n
l = K
n
l =Nl. Given
that the equality wsl = w
n
l must hold when o¤shoring is present (i.e., o
s > 0), we have19
Ksl
Ls   os
1 
= 

Knl
Ln + os
1 
, os = 
1=(1 )Knl L
s  Ksl Ln
1=(1 )Knl + K
s
l
, (22)
where we have used ls + os = Ls and ln = Ln. As shown in Proposition 1, the equilibrium
features o¤shoring if and only if  is su¢ ciently large. Equation (22) highlights the intuition
of this result as follows: the productivity  of o¤shored workers must be su¢ ciently high in
order for Northern rms to nd them worth hiring at the Southern market wage wsl . Holding
Knl and K
s
l constant, an increase in L
s or a decrease in Ln reduces the relative wage wsl =w
n
l
for a given os and hence raises the amount of o¤shoring os in equilibrium. In contrast, an
increase in Ksl or a decrease in K
n
l in the labor-intensive sector raises the relative wage
wsl =w
n
l for a given o
s and reduces the amount of o¤shoring os in equilibrium.
3 How the South a¤ects innovation in the North
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of a reduction in the supply of Southern unskilled
labor Ls and an increase in Southern capital Ks on the direction of Northern innovation.
In Section 3.1, we provide a qualitative analysis. In Section 3.2, we calibrate the model to
provide numerical results.
19Recall that Knl and K
s
l are endogenous variables that are determined by parameters including K
n and
Ks. In Appendix A, we provide the equilibrium conditions that implicitly determine the unique equilibrium
value of os as a function of parameters.
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3.1 Qualitative analysis
We sketch out the results in the main text and relegate the detailed derivations to Appendix
A. First, we explore the e¤ects of o¤shoring os on the relative value of skill-intensive and
labor-intensive inventions. From (8) and (10), one can derive the following conditional
demand functions for xnl (i) and x
n
h(j):
xnl (i) =

Pl(Nl)
1 
pnl (i)
1=
(ln + os), (23)
xnh(j) =

Ph(Nh)
1 
pnh(j)
1=
hn. (24)
The steady-state version of (19) simplies to
Vh
Vl
=
nh + 
s
h
nl + 
s
l
=
pnhx
n
h + p
s
hx
s
h
pnl x
n
l + p
s
lx
s
l
, (25)
where pnh = p
n
l = 
nqn = pn and psh = p
s
l = 
sqs = ps. Substituting (23) and (24) into (25)
yields
Vh
Vl
=

Nh
Nl
(1 )= 
Ph
Pl
1=
| {z }
price e¤ect
Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls + (   )os| {z }
market size e¤ect
, (26)
where we have also used pn = =(1 )ps. From (26), we obtain the following intuition.
Holding constant the market size e¤ect, a decrease in the supply of Southern unskilled labor
Ls leads to a negative price e¤ect by decreasing Ph=Pl. As a result, Vh=Vl decreases causing
innovation to be directed towards labor-intensive goods, and this gives rise to unskill-biased
technical change (i.e., Nh=Nl decreases). However, the decrease in the supply of Southern
unskilled labor Ls also leads to a positive market size e¤ect by decreasing o¤shoring os and
the term Ls + (   )os in the denominator of the market size e¤ect. As a result, Vh=Vl
increases causing innovation to be directed towards skill-intensive goods, and this gives rise
to skill-biased technical change (i.e., Nh=Nl increases). On the balanced growth path, the
equilibrium value of Nh=Nl is derived by imposing Vh=Vl = 1 in (26).20
To better understand the e¤ects of o¤shoring os on the direction of technical progress,
we now derive the equilibrium value of Nh=Nl.21
Nh
Nl
=

1  

 "
1 (1 )(" 1)

Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls
  1
1 (1 )(" 1)
| {z }
price e¤ect

Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls + (   )os
 1+(" 1)
1 (1 )(" 1)
| {z }
market size e¤ect
,
(27)
where " > 1 and 1  (1  )("  1) > 0 because  > ("  2)=("  1). Equation (27) conrms
the previous claim that a decrease in Ls causes a negative e¤ect on Nh=Nl via the price
e¤ect. Furthermore, (27) shows " > 1 implies that the exponent associated with the market
20Recall that Vh = Vl =  from (18).
21See the derivations of (A12) in Appendix A.
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size e¤ect is greater than the exponent associated with the price e¤ect. As a result, the
market size e¤ect dominates the price e¤ect such that a decrease in Ls leads to an increase
in Nh=Nl as we will show in Appendix A. This is true regardless of the level of Southern
patent protection  2 [0; ]. In the special case of complete Southern patent protection (i.e.,
 = ), (27) nicely simplies to
Nh
Nl
=
"
1  

"
Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls
(" 1)# 11 (1 )(" 1)
, (27a)
which clearly shows that a decrease in Ls leads to an increase in Nh=Nl if and only if " > 1.
What happens when o¤shoring is absent in the equilibrium? In this case, the result
depends on the level of patent protection in the South. To illustrate the role of patent
protection in the absence of o¤shoring, we focus on the two special cases of zero and complete
patent protection in the South. In the case of zero Southern patent protection (i.e.,  = 0),
changes in Ls do not cause any market size e¤ect. As a result, a decrease in Ls leads to
unskill-biased technical change (i.e., Nh=Nl decreases) via the price e¤ect. In the case of
complete Southern patent protection (i.e.,  = ), changes in Ls also cause the market size
e¤ect, which dominates the price e¤ect given " > 1. In this case, a decrease in Ls leads to
skill-biased technical change (i.e., Nh=Nl increases) despite the absence of o¤shoring. We
summarize all the above results in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 If the equilibrium features o¤shoring, then a decrease in the supply of South-
ern unskilled labor would lead to skill-biased technical change. If the equilibrium does not fea-
ture o¤shoring, then the e¤ects would depend on the level of patent protection in the South as
follows: (a) under zero Southern patent protection, a decrease in the supply of Southern un-
skilled labor leads to unskill-biased technical change; and (b) under complete Southern patent
protection, a decrease in the supply of Southern unskilled labor leads to skill-biased technical
change.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition for Proposition 2 can be explained as follows. In the absence of o¤shoring,
any change in the supply of unskilled labor in the South causes only a price e¤ect on the
value of inventions. As in Acemoglu (2003), a decrease in Ls raises the world price of goods
produced with unskilled labor thereby leading to innovation biased in favor of the unskilled.
In this case, the market size e¤ect is absent due to zero patent protection or more generally,
weak patent protection in the South, so that production in the South generates a negligible
amount of monopolistic prot. In the presence of o¤shoring, some Southern workers are hired
to work with Northern intermediate inputs that are protected by complete patent protection
in the North. As a result, a decrease in the supply of Southern unskilled labor causes through
o¤shoring a negative market size e¤ect on the value of labor-intensive inventions leading to
innovation biased in favor of the skilled. This result is also consistent with the nding in
Acemoglu (2003) under complete Southern patent protection without o¤shoring. In other
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words, Southern patent protection and o¤shoring serve as two substitutable channels through
which the supply of unskilled labor in the South causes a market size e¤ect on the value of
inventions in the North.
The results in Proposition 2 have the following implications. First, the opening of the
Chinese economy for international trade in the 1980s implied a massive increase in the supply
of unskilled labor and caused skilled-biased technical change because patent protection in
China was very weak and there was very little o¤shoring to China at that time. Second,
stronger patent protection in China and the substantial amount of o¤shoring to China in
the present imply that it would now be a decrease in the supply of unskilled labor in China
that leads to skill-biased technical change.
As for the e¤ect of increasing capital in China, a larger Ks leads to an increase in
Ksl . As a result, w
s
l increases holding other variables constant. Given that the condition
wsl = w
n
l must hold in the presence of o¤shoring, an increase in K
s
l reduces o
s as shown in
(22). Intuitively, a larger Ksl increases the wage rate of Southern unskilled labor rendering
o¤shoring less attractive. As shown in (26) and (27), this reduction in os generally triggers a
market size e¤ect unless the level of patent protection in the South is complete (i.e.,  = ).
Therefore, as long as the level of Southern patent protection is incomplete (i.e.,  < ), a
larger capital stock in the South leads to skill-biased technical change (i.e., Nh=Nl increases).
In the special case of complete Southern patent protection (i.e.,  = ), (27a) shows that
Nh=Nl is independent of Ks. Intuitively, although a larger Ks reduces o¤shoring os, any
decrease in os is o¤set by an equal increase in unskilled labor ls devoted to production in the
South. Because of complete Southern patent protection, the market size e¤ect of unskilled
labor depends on Ls regardless of its distribution in os and ls. Therefore, despite its e¤ect
on o¤shoring os, a larger Southern capital stock Ks no longer leads to skill-biased technical
change under complete patent protection. We summarize these results in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 If the equilibrium features o¤shoring, then an increase in Southern capital
stock would have the following e¤ects: (a) it leads to skill-biased technical change under
incomplete (and zero) Southern patent protection; and (b) it has no e¤ect on the direction
of innovation under complete Southern patent protection.
Proof. See Appendix A.
What happens when o¤shoring is absent in the equilibrium? In the absence of o¤shoring,
increasing Ks has a positive e¤ect on Nh=Nl (i.e., skill-biased technical change) under zero
patent protection in the South, and this e¤ect operates through the price e¤ect. The intuition
can be explained as follows. Suppose there is a zero supply of high-skilled labor Hs in the
South. Then, a larger capital stock Ks expands only the production of labor-intensive goods
Y sl , which leads to a positive price e¤ect by increasing Ph=Pl and consequently skill-biased
technical change. Under complete patent protection in the South, increasing Ks has a
negative e¤ect on Nh=Nl (i.e., unskill-biased technical change). This e¤ect operates through
the market size e¤ect under which the increased supply of labor-intensive goods Y sl raises the
value of labor-intensive inventions relative to skill-intensive inventions. A similar intuition
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also applies to the more general case of Hs=Ls < Hn=Ln, which we have assumed throughout
the analysis. We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If the equilibrium does not feature o¤shoring, then the e¤ects of Southern
capital stock would depend on the level of patent protection in the South as follows: (a) under
zero Southern patent protection, an increase in Southern capital stock leads to skill-biased
technical change; and (b) under complete Southern patent protection, an increase in Southern
capital stock leads to unskill-biased technical change.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In the rest of this section, we explore the e¤ects of Ls and Ks on the skill premium in
the presence of o¤shoring. In Appendix B, we derive
wnh
wnl
=
wsh
wsl
=
"
1  

"=(" 1)
Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls
 1=(" 1) Hn + 

Hs
Ln + 

Ls + os(   )=
!#
, (28)
where   ("  1) =[1  (1  )("  1)] > 0 because " > 1 and  > ("  2)=("  1). Suppose
we consider the special case of complete Southern patent protection (i.e.,  = ). Then, (28)
simplies to
wnh
wnl
=
wsh
wsl
=
"
1  

"=(" 1)
Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls
(" 2)=(" 1)#
. (28a)
In the case of complete Southern patent protection, a decrease in Ls raises the skill premium
wnh=w
n
l if and only if " is greater than a threshold value of two, under which the market
size e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong to induce a positive relationship between relative supply
Hs=Ls and relative wage wsh=w
s
l . In the case of incomplete Southern patent protection (i.e.,
 < ), our numerical results indicate that this threshold value of " can be slightly below
two. Another interesting implication from (28a) is that under complete Southern patent
protection, wnh=w
n
l is independent of K
s. In other words, an increase in Ks raises the skill
premium if and only if  < , under which Ks increases wnh=w
n
l by decreasing o¤shoring o
s
as shown in (28).
3.2 Numerical results
In the previous section, we show that whenever o¤shoring is present, a decrease in unskilled
labor and an increase in capital in the South leads to skill-biased technical change. However,
we are also interested in quantitative implications. Therefore, in this section, we calibrate
the model for the general case of incomplete Southern patent protection in order to provide
an illustrative numerical investigation on the e¤ects of changes in unskilled labor and capital
in China on the skill premium in both countries. The model features the following set of
parameters f"; ; ; ; ; Ls; Hs; Ln; Hn; Ks; Kng.22 We either consider standard values of
these parameters or calibrate them using empirical moments in China and the US.
22It can be shown that the calibration and simulation of the interested variables are independent of f; g.
14
For the labor-share parameter , we set  to the lower value of 0.4 in China,23 which
also implies a more realistic markup n = 1=(1   ) = 1:67. According to the Ginarte-
Park index of patent rights, the level of patent protection in China from 1995 to 2005
is on average 63.5% of that in the US, so we set s   1 = 0:635(n   1), which implies
  1   1=s = 0:30 in China. We normalize Southern unskilled labor Ls to unity and
compute Southern skilled labor Hs using data on the share of population in China with at
least some tertiary education (i.e., Hs=(Hs + Ls), which is 2.9% in 1995 according to the
Barro-Lee dataset on education attainment). Similarly, we compute Northern unskilled labor
Ln and skilled labor Hn using data on the share of population in the US with at least some
tertiary education (i.e., Hn=(Hn + Ln), which is 46.5% in 1995 according to the Barro-Lee
dataset) and the relative population size between China and the US (i.e., (Hs+Ls)=(Hn+Ln),
which is 4.57 in 1995 according to the Penn World Table). We normalize Northern capital
Kn to unity and compute Southern capital Ks using data on the relative GDP between
China and the US (i.e., (PhY sh + PlY
s
l )=(PhY
n
h + PlY
n
l ), which is 0.35 in 1995 according
to the Penn World Table). For the remaining parameters f"; ; g, we consider a range of
values for the substitution elasticity " 2 f2:0; 2:1; 2:2g.24 For each value of ", we calibrate the
values of f; g using the following moments. For the o¤shoring parameter , we calibrate 
using the value of exports in China as a share of GDP, which is 20.5% in 1995.25 Finally, we
calibrate the relative share  of labor-intensive goods using the college premium in China
(i.e., wsh=w
s
l , which is 1.21 in 1992).
26 Table 1 reports the calibrated parameter values.27
Table 1: Calibrated parameters under di¤erent values of "
": substitution elasticity 2:0 2:1 2:2
: o¤shoring parameter 0:15 0:15 0:15
: relative share of labor-intensive goods 0:50 0:49 0:48
: Northern patent protection 0:4 0:4 0:4
: Southern patent protection 0:3 0:3 0:3
Ls: Southern unskilled labor 1 1 1
Hs: Southern skilled labor 0:03 0:03 0:03
Ln: Northern unskilled labor 0:12 0:12 0:12
Hn: Northern skilled labor 0:10 0:10 0:10
Ks: Southern capital 0:10 0:10 0:10
Kn: Northern capital 1 1 1
We consider the following policy experiment. We decrease the supply of unskilled labor
and increase capital in China and examine their e¤ects on Nh=Nl and wsh=w
s
l .
28 From 1995
to 2005, the share of population without any tertiary education in China decreases by about
23See for example Luo and Zhang (2010) for data on labor share in China.
24Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) consider " = 2 whereas Gancia and Zilibotti (2009) consider a case in
which " > 2. Therefore, we consider a small range of values for "  2.
25Data source: China Statistical Yearbook.
26See Ge and Yang (2014).
27We provide the equilibrium expressions for calibration in Appendix B.
28In our model, the skill premiums in the North and the South are the same; i.e., wnh=w
n
l = w
s
h=w
s
l .
15
2%.29 The relative GDP between China and the US increases from 0.35 in 1995 to 0.49 in
2005. We use this change in relative GDP to calibrate the change in Ks, which increases
by about 40%. During this period, the relative wage wsh=w
s
l between workers with college
education and workers with high school education in China increases by about 25%.30 We
examine how large a fraction of this increase in the skill premium can be attributed to the
changes in Ls and Ks. Table 2 reports the results for di¤erent values of ".31 Due to skill-
biased technical change, the decrease in Ls and the increase in Ks in China raise the skill
premium in both countries. The magnitude of the changes is sensitive to the value of " (i.e.,
the elasticity of substitution between skill-intensive and labor-intensive goods) as is well
known in the literature. Suppose we consider a moderate value of " = 2 as our benchmark.
Then, we nd that the decrease in Ls and the increase in Ks in China would lead to a
8.5% increase in wsh=w
s
l , which explains about one-third of the observed increase in the skill
premium in China. If we consider a larger value of " = 2:2, then the decrease in Ls and
the increase in Ks in China would raise wsh=w
s
l by as much as 17.8%. Quantitatively, the
increase in capital is responsible for the vast majority of these e¤ects given that the change
in Ls has been small relative to the change in Ks.
Table 2:32 Simulated e¤ects of Ls and Ks
" 2:0 2:1 2:2
Nh=Nl 13:4% 17:2% 23:5%
wnh=w
n
l 8:5% 12:0% 17:8%
As for the e¤ects of a further decrease in Ls or a further increase in Ks, we compute the
elasticities of Nh=Nl and wsh=w
s
l with respect to L
s and Ks at the new values of Ls and Ks.
Table 3 reports the results. Suppose we consider a moderate value of " = 2. Then, we nd
that a 1% decrease in unskilled labor Ls in China would lead to a 0.1% increase in wsh=w
s
l ,
whereas a 1% increase in capital Ks in China would lead to a 0.3% increase in wsh=w
s
l . If we
consider a larger value of " = 2:2, then a 1% decrease in unskilled labor in China would raise
wsh=w
s
l by as much as 0.6%, whereas a 1% increase in capital would raise w
s
h=w
s
l by 0.5%.
Table 3: Future changes in Ls or Ks
Table 3a: 1% decrease in Ls
" 2:0 2:1 2:2
Nh=Nl 0:7% 0:9% 1:3%
wnh=w
n
l 0:1% 0:3% 0:6%
Table 3b: 1% increase in Ks
" 2:0 2:1 2:2
Nh=Nl 0:4% 0:5% 0:7%
wnh=w
n
l 0:3% 0:4% 0:5%
29The decrease in the share of population without completion of secondary education in China is more
dramatic. Therefore, considering tertiary education (rather than the completion of secondary education) as
the cuto¤ for skilled versus unskilled makes our results more conservative.
30See Ge and Yang (2014).
31The results in Table 2 are expressed as percent changes in Nh=Nl and wnh=w
n
l .
32In this table, we report the e¤ects of the observed changes between 1995 and 2005 with Ls decreasing
by 2% and Ks increasing by 40%.
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4 Conclusion
In this study, we have analyzed how economic development in China could lead to skill-
biased technical change in the US. In our analysis, we have assumed that the supply of
unskilled labor and the capital stock are exogenous. In reality, they are all endogenous
variables. In the case of China, their changes are mainly driven by economic development.
As the economy develops, the supply of unskilled labor decreases and the stock of physical
capital increases. As a result, the smaller supply of unskilled labor and the larger supply
of physical capital reinforce each other in triggering skill-biased technical change through
o¤shoring. Furthermore, if the reduction in the supply of unskilled labor also increases the
skill premium in both the US and China as in our simulation results, then there would
be more incentives for skill acquisition in both countries further decreasing the supply of
unskilled labor and triggering skill-biased technical change. Therefore, we conjecture that our
results are robust to the endogenous accumulation of physical and human capital. However,
allowing for these additional features would complicate our analysis signicantly, so that we
leave these interesting extensions to future research.
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Appendix A
In this appendix, we provide proofs of the propositions. Before we proceed to the proofs,
it would be helpful to rst present the following preliminary derivations. The prices of
intermediate inputs do not depend on z 2 fl; hg, so that pnl;t = pnh;t = nqnt = pnt and
psl;t = p
s
h;t = 
sqst = p
s
t . The conditional demand functions for low-skilled and high-skilled
workers are
wsl;t =
Pl;t
1   (l
s
t )
 1  xsl;t1  (Nl;t)2 , (A1-a)
wnl;t =
Pl;t
1   (l
n
t + o
s
t)
 1  xnl;t1  (Nl;t)2 , (A1-b)
wsh;t =
Ph;t
1   (h
s
t)
 1  xsh;t1  (Nh;t)2 , (A1-c)
wnh;t =
Ph;t
1   (h
n
t )
 1  xnh;t1  (Nh;t)2 . (A1-d)
The conditional demand functions for intermediate inputs are
xsl;t = (Pl;t)
1
 (pst)
  1
 (lst )(Nl;t)
1 
 , (A1-e)
xnl;t = (Pl;t)
1
 (pnt )
  1
 (lnt + o
s
t)(Nl;t)
1 
 , (A1-f)
xsh;t = (Ph;t)
1
 (pst)
  1
 (hst)(Nh;t)
1 
 , (A1-g)
xnh;t = (Ph;t)
1
 (pnt )
  1
 (hnt )(Nh;t)
1 
 . (A1-h)
When o¤shoring takes place in equilibrium (i.e., ost > 0), the marginal productivity of do-
mestic unskilled labor must be proportional to the marginal productivity of foreign unskilled
labor subject to the o¤shoring cost ; therefore, we have wnl;t = w
s
l;t. Using this condition
along with the above rst-order conditions, we obtain
pnt
pst
= 

1  . (A2)
Because the nal-goods sector is perfectly competitive, prot maximization implies
Ph;t
Pl;t
=
1  

 
Y nh;t + Y
s
h;t
Y nl;t + Y
s
l;t
!  1
"
. (A3)
The production functions (7)-(10) can be re-expressed as
Y sl;t =
lst
1   (Pl;t)
1 
 (Nl;t)
1
 (pst)
  1 
 ; (A4-a)
Y nl;t =
lnt + o
s
t
1   (Pl;t)
1 
 (Nl;t)
1
 (pnt )
  1 
 ; (A4-b)
Y sh;t =
hst
1   (Ph;t)
1 
 (Nh;t)
1
 (pst)
  1 
 ; (A4-c)
Y nh;t =
hnt
1   (Ph;t)
1 
 (Nh;t)
1
 (pnt )
  1 
 : (A4-d)
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Taking into account (A4) together with the labor-market-clearing conditions, (A2) and (A3)
imply
Ph;t
Pl;t
=

1  

 "
1+(" 1)

Nh;t
Nl;t
  1
1+(" 1)

Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls
  
1+(" 1)
, (A5)
which serves as the rst condition that we will use to solve for the steady-state equilibrium
values of fNh;t=Nl;t; Ph;t=Pl;t; ostg. The other two conditions can be derived as follows.
The R&D conditions imply that Vz;t =  and thus _Vz;t = 0 when _Nz;t > 0 for z 2 fl; hg.
Using (19), we obtain
rt =
nz;t + 
s
z;t

. (A6)
The steady-state equilibrium bias of Nh;t=Nl;t is found by imposing Vh;t=Vl;t = (nh;t +
sh;t)=(
n
l;t + 
s
l;t) = 1. Also, using (13), (16), (A1) and (A2), we derive
Ph;t
Pl;t
=

Nh;t
Nl;t
 (1 ) 

Hs +Hn


(Ls   ost) + Ln + ost
! 
. (A7)
Finally, the capital-market conditions give rise to33
Ph;t
Pl;t
=

Nh;t
Nl;t
 10@

1=(1 )K
n
Ks
+ 

ost + L
n   1=(1 )Ls Kn
Ks
1=(1 )Hs K
n
Ks
 Hn
1A , (A8)
noting (A1) and (A2). The steady-state equilibrium values of fNh;t=Nl;t; Ph;t=Pl;t; ostg are
determined by (A5), (A7) and (A8) along with the resource constraint ost 2 [0; Ls].
Proof of Proposition 1 . Using (A7), one can show that if the following inequality holds,
Ph;t
Pl;t
>

Nh;t
Nl;t
 (1 ) 

Hs +Hn


(Ls   os) + Ln + os
! 
, (A9)
then Vh;t =
 
nh;t + 
s
h;t

=rt =  and Vl;t < , which imply that _Nh;t > 0 and _Nl;t = 0:
Combined with (A5), this inequality can be rewritten as
Nh;t
Nl;t
<

1  

 "
1 (1 )(" 1)

Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls
  1
1 (1 )(" 1)  

Hs+Hn


(Ls os)+Ln+os
 1+(" 1)
1 (1 )(" 1)
,
(A10)
where os 2 [0; Ls] is given by its steady-state equilibrium value. Thus, following Acemoglu
and Zilibotti (2001), we have shown that there is only one type of innovation o¤ the steady
33To derive (A8), we use
Ks
Kn
=
xsh;tNh;t + x
s
l;tNl;t
xnh;tNh;t + x
n
l;tNl;t
=
Nl;t (Pl;t)
1
 (pst )
  1
 (lst )(Nl;t)
1 
 +Nh;t (Ph;t)
1
 (pst )
  1
 (Hs)(Nh;t)
1 

Nl;t (Pl;t)
1
 (pnt )
  1
 (Ln+lst )(Nl;t)
1 
 +Nh;t (Ph;t)
1
 (pnt )
  1
 (Hn)(Nh;t)
1 

:
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state, and the economy monotonically reaches the balanced growth path in nite time. On
the balanced growth path, Nh;t and Nl;t grow at the same rate g. The same proof can be
applied to an economy starting from Nh;t=Nl;t larger than the right-hand side of (A10).
Next we show that the steady-state equilibrium growth rate g = _Nh;t=Nh;t = _Nl;t=Nl;t =
_Cnt =C
n
t = _C
s
t =C
s
t is constant and positive. By the Euler equation (3), the steady-state growth
rate is given by g = r   : From (A6),
r =
nz + 
s
z

=
pnzx
n
z + p
s
zx
s
z

> 0,
where the second equality uses (13) and (16). Substituting (A1-e) and (A1-f) into this
condition yields
r =

PlNl
ps
 1 

(Pl)


(Ln + os) + (Ls   os)

,
which uses pn = ps=(1 ) from (A2) and the resource constraints ls = Ls  os and ln = Ln.
By substituting (A8) for PlNl, (B1-a) for Pl; and (B2) for ps, the steady-state interest rate
becomes
r =



1=(1 )HsKn  HnKs
1  h
Ln + 

Ls +

1  


os
i
[HsLn  HnLs + (Hn + Hs) os]1 
"
" + (1  )"

Ph
Pl
1 "# 1" 1
,
(A11)
where Ph=Pl and os are constant and unique in the steady-state equilibrium as we will show
below. Therefore, the steady-state equilibrium growth rate g = r   must also be constant.
Furthermore, we can ensure that g > 0 by assuming a su¢ ciently small  or .
In the rest of this proof, we consider the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Using (A5), (A7) and (A8), we derive the following two conditions that can be used to solve
for the steady-state equilibrium values of fNh=Nl; osg.
Nh
Nl
=

1  

 "
1 (1 )(" 1)

Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls
  1
1 (1 )(" 1)
 


Hs +Hn


(Ls   os) + Ln + os
! 1+(" 1)
1 (1 )(" 1)
(A12)
 F (os),
Nh
Nl
=


1  
 "
" 1

Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls
 1
" 1
0@


1
1  Kn
Ks
+ 

os + Ln    11  Kn
Ks
Ls

1
1  Kn
Ks
Hs  Hn
1A
1+(" 1)
(" 1)
(A13)
 G(os).
F (os) is (weakly) decreasing in os because   . As for G(os), it depends on the value of ;
specically, there are three parameter spaces to consider: (a)  > [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 , (b)
[(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1  <  < [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 ,34 and (c)   [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1 .
Recall that [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1  > [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1  because Hn=Ln > Hs=Ls.
34It can be shown that if  = [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1  , then os =

1=1 Kn=Ks Ln=Ls
1=1 Kn=Ks+

Ls instead of being
determined by (A13).
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Case (a): If  > [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 , then G(os) is strictly increasing in os guaran-
teeing the uniqueness of the equilibrium (if it exists). To establish its existence, we need to
ensure that F (os) and G(os) cross within os 2 [0; Ls]. First, F (0) > G(0) because F (0) > 0
and G(0) < 0 as a result of Ln    11  Kn
Ks
Ls < 0. Second, F (Ls) < G(Ls) would also hold if
and only if  is su¢ ciently large.
Case (b): If [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1  <  < [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 , thenG(os) would be de-
creasing in os. Furthermore, G(os) would be positive if and only if os <

1=1 Kn=Ks Ln=Ls
1=1 Kn=Ks+

Ls.
As os !

1=1 Kn=Ks Ln=Ls
1=1 Kn=Ks+

Ls, G(os) = 0 < F (os). Finally, G(0) > F (0) would also hold
if and only if  is su¢ ciently large; in this case, it can be shown that G(os) crosses F (os)
exactly once from above.35
Case (c): If   [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1 , then  < [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1  implying that

1
1  Kn
Ks
Hs Hn < 0 in G(os). In this case, G(os) must be nonpositive for os 2 [0; Ls] because
Ln    11  Kn
Ks
Ls  0; therefore, an o¤shoring equilibrium does not exist.
Proof of Propositions 2, 3 and 4. By eliminating os from (A12) and (A13), we derive
the following condition that implicitly determines Nh=Nl:
Hn
Hs
+ 


Nh
Nl
  1 (1 )(" 1)
1+(" 1) = (1  

) 
1
1 Kn=Ks Hn=Hs

1
1 Kn=Ks+

Nh
Nl
 " 1
1+(" 1)
(A14)
+
 
Ln+Ls
Hs
 (" 1)
1+(" 1) 
1
1 Kn=Ks+(=)

1
1 Kn=Ks+


1 
 "
1+(" 1)  Hn
Hs
+ 
 1
1+(" 1) ,
Once again, we need to consider the two parameter spaces under which o¤shoring exists: (a)
 > [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1  and (b) [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1  <  < [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 .
Case (a): If  > [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 , then the right-hand side of (A14) is increasing
in Nh=Nl, whereas the left-hand side of (A14) is always decreasing in Nh=Nl. In this case, a
decrease in Ls shifts down the right-hand side and gives rise to a larger equilibrium value of
Nh=Nl. An increase in Ks shifts down the right-hand side (because  < ), which gives rise
to a larger equilibrium value of Nh=Nl:
Case (b): If [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1  <  < [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 , then the right-hand
side of (A14) is also decreasing in Nh=Nl and crosses the left-hand side exactly once from
below in the feasible space.36 In this case, a decrease in Ls shifts down the right-hand side
and also gives rise to a larger equilibrium value of Nh=Nl. An increase in Ks shifts down the
right-hand side, which gives rise to a larger equilibrium value of Nh=Nl:When  = ; (A14)
does not depend on Ks: We summarize these results in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1: If  > [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1 , then a decrease in Ls or an increase in Ks
would lead to an increase in Nh=Nl for  2 [0; ): When  = ; an increase in Ks has no
e¤ect on Nh=Nl; whereas a decrease in Ls still leads to an increase in Nh=Nl.
35On the other hand, if G(0) < F (0), then the model may feature multiple equilibria, which we rule out
by imposing a su¢ ciently large  to ensure that G(0) > F (0) holds.
36In fact, after it crosses the left-hand side from below, the right-hand side crosses the left-hand side once
again from above. However, it can be shown from (A12) and (A13) that the second intersection (with a
higher value of Nh=Nl) is infeasible because it implies os < 0:
22
No-o¤shoring equilibrium: Now we consider the case of   [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1 ,
under which o¤shoring does not take place in equilibrium (i.e., os = 0). In this case, we
derive three equilibrium conditions,
Ph
Pl
=

1  

 "
1+(" 1)

Nh
Nl
  1
1+(" 1)
"
(ps) (1 )=Hs + (pn) (1 )=Hn
(ps) (1 )= Ls + (pn) (1 )= Ln
#  
1+(" 1)
, (A15)
Ph
Pl
=

Nh
Nl
 (1 ) "
(=) (ps) (1 )=Hs + (pn) (1 )=Hn
(=) (ps) (1 )= Ls + (pn) (1 )= Ln
# 
, (A16)
and 
pn
ps
1=
=
Ks
Kn
"
Ln + (Ph=Pl)
1= (Nh=Nl)
1=Hn
Ls + (Ph=Pl)
1= (Nh=Nl)1=Hs
#
, (A17)
which correspond to (A5), (A7) and (A8), respectively.
Zero patent protection in the South: Suppose  = 0. Substituting (A16) and (A17) into
(A15), we obtain
Nh
Nl
=

1  

 "
1 (1 )(" 1)

Hn
Ln
 1+(" 1)
1 (1 )(" 1)
"
Ls

Ks
Kn

1+
Nh
Nl
1 
+Ln

Ls
Ln
+H
s
Hn
Nh
Nl
1 
Hs

Ks
Kn

1+
Nh
Nl
1 
+Hn

Ls
Ln
+H
s
Hn
Nh
Nl
1 
# 1
1 (1 )(" 1)
.
(A18)
Because Hn=Ln > Hs=Ls, the right-hand side is monotonically increasing and concave in
Nh=Nl, which ensures the unique existence of a steady-state equilibrium. One can show that
the right-hand side is increasing in Ls and Ks, so we can prove the following lemma by
means of a usual graphical analysis.
Lemma 2: If   [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1 , then there would be no outsourcing in equilib-
rium (i.e., os = 0). In this case, if  = 0, then an increase in Ks would lead to an increase
in Nh=Nl whereas a decrease in Ls would lead to a decrease in Nh=Nl.
Complete patent protection in the South: Suppose  = . Using (A15)(A17), we obtain

Nh
Nl
 " 2
(" 1)
=

1  

 "
(" 1)
Ls
0B@Hn Ln( 1  )
"
(" 1) (Nh=Nl)
1 (1 )(" 1)
(" 1)
Ls( 1  )
"
(" 1) (Nh=Nl)
1 (1 )(" 1)
(" 1)  Hs
1CA
1
1 
 Ln Ks
Kn
Hn K
s
Kn
 Hs
0B@Hn Ln( 1  )
"
(" 1) (Nh=Nl)
1 (1 )(" 1)
(" 1)
Ls( 1  )
"
(" 1) (Nh=Nl)
1 (1 )(" 1)
(" 1)  Hs
1CA
1
1 
: (A19)
The right-hand side is decreasing in Nh;t=Nl;t, and it can be shown to be decreasing in Ls
and Ks: When "  2; where the left-hand side is increasing in Nh;t=Nl;t, (A19) uniquely
determines Nh;t=Nl;t; which is decreasing in Ls and Ks: When " < 2; the left-hand side
of (A19) is also decreasing, which gives rise to a potential possibility of multiple solutions.
However, if we focus on a unique equilibrium case by some su¢ cient conditions,37 it is easy
to verify that Nh;t=Nl;t is also decreasing in Ls and Ks by means of a graphical analysis.
37One can show that these conditions include a su¢ ciently large  and su¢ ciently small Hn=Hs, Ls=Ln
and Kn=Ks.
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Lemma 3: If  < [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1 , then there would be no outsourcing in equilib-
rium (i.e., os = 0). In this case, if  = , then an increase in Ks would lead to a decrease
in Nh=Nl where as a decrease in Ls would lead to an increase in Nh=Nl.
Finally, note that Lemmata 1, 2 and 3 prove Propositions 2, 3 and 4.
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Appendix B
In this appendix, we provide the equilibrium expressions for calibrating the model: (a) o¤-
shoring as a share of GDP wsl o
s=(PlY
s
l +PhY
s
h ), (b) the relative GDP (PlY
s
l +PhY
s
h )=(PhY
n
h +
PlY
n
l ), and (c) the skill premium w
n
h=w
n
l = w
s
h=w
s
l . Note that (5) implies
Pl =
"
" + (1  )"

Ph
Pl
1 "# 1" 1
, (B1-a)
Ph =
"
"

Ph
Pl
 (1 ")
+ (1  )"
# 1
" 1
. (B1-b)
Then, using the capital-market condition for s and (A1), we obtain
ps = (Ks) 
h
(PlNl)
1= ls + (PhNh)
1=Hs
i
. (B2)
As for PlY nl + PhY
n
h , we use (A4) to obtain
PhY
n
h + PlY
n
l =


1 KnPlNl
1  

HsLn  HnLs + (Hn + Hs) os

1
1 KnHs  KsHn

, (B3)
noting (A2) and (A8). Using (A1), we obtain
wsl =
PlNl
1  

PlNl
ps
 1 

. (B4)
Using (A4), (A8) and (B2), we obtain
PlY
s
l + PhY
s
h =
KsPlNl
1  

HsLn  HnLs + (Hn + Hs) os

1
1 KnHs  KsHn

. (B5)
Using (B2), (B4) and (B5), we obtain
wsl o
s
PlY sl + PhY
s
h
=



1
1 KnHs  KsHn

os
Ks [HsLn  HnLs + (Hn + Hs) os] . (B6)
Using (B3) and (B5), we obtain
PlY
s
l + PhY
s
h
PhY nh + PlY
n
l
=
Ks


1 Kn
. (B7)
Finally, using (A1), we obtain
wnh
wnl
=
wsh
wsl
=

Ph
Pl
Nh
Nl
 1

. (B8)
By (A5) and (A7),
Ph
Pl
Nh
Nl
 1

=
"
1  

"=(" 1)
Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls
 1=(" 1) Hn + 

Hs
Ln + 

Ls + os(   )=
!# " 1
1 (1 )(" 1)
.
(B9)
Then, (B8) and (B9) imply (28).
25
